The lack of transparency in European Union (EU) decision-making and integration has been a long-standing concern in academic and public debate. Perhaps paradoxically, parliamentary oversight of executive power in the EU is also increasingly taking place behind closed doors. This closed oversight results from internal rule-making and interinstitutional agreements established by the European Parliament and executive actors without a public debate and is primarily aimed at safeguarding EU official secrets. This paper examines the role of the European Parliament in oversight in the context of EU executive secrecy. The paper argues that, although the European Parliament asserts its prerogatives for gaining access to EU official secrets, its current practice of closed oversight does not facilitate public deliberation. The European Parliament is yet to make serious efforts to develop its public deliberation function and, in doing so, to also bring attention to possible extensive secrecy practices.
Introduction
The lack of transparency in European Union (EU) decision-making and integration has been a long-standing concern in academic and public debate. 1 
EU integration is
As an interviewed former MEP acknowledged, these rigid rules in support of confidentiality make oversight 'difficult or impossible ' . 9 Another important aspect of closed oversight, thus far neglected in the literature, is that it challenges the essential role of the European Parliament to promote public deliberation. Public deliberation is highly salient from a democratic perspective in order to include citizens' contributions to EU decision-making. The European Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution and the main public deliberation platform making openness and debate crucial to its workings. This paper examines the oversight role of the European Parliament in the context of EU executive secrecy. It reveals that the European Parliament asserts its oversight role, but that current practice does not meet the standard of democratic oversight facilitating public deliberation. European parliamentary oversight could contribute to public deliberation as an equally salient democratic process if it were conducted in a more open manner, or if the oversight results were reported and/or discussed publically.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides the key aspects of the legal framework of EU official secrets, focusing on the main challenge of accessing information. It discusses the efforts of the European Parliament to countervail these limitations as well as the outcome of these efforts. Section III examines in more detail how oversight by the European Parliament takes place and thereupon critically assesses its implications particularly for public deliberation. Section IV offers some conclusions.
EU secrecy: an invincible parliamentary challenge?
'Monetary policy is a serious issue. We should discuss this in secret. I am ready to be insulted as being insufficiently democratic, but I want to be serious (...) I am for dark, secret debates ' . 10 This is a frank response by the current President of the European Commission to the questions of journalists regarding the coordination of the euro crisis. Although 9 Interview with former Member of the European Parliament (Amsterdam, the Netherlands, (February 2015)); see also Andrew Rettman, 'Secret documents group was like "bad Le Carre novel, " MEP says' EU Observer (Brussels, 18 November 2010). 10 Valentina Pop, 'Eurogroup Chief: "I'm for secret, dark debates"' EU Observer (Brussels, 21 April 2011).
anecdotal, this statement nonetheless illustrates a longstanding preference for secrecy in the European Union. 11 Secrecy may be understood as the inaccessibility of information about an actor, which prevents other actors from monitoring the workings or performance of this actor. 12 Secrecy in the EU is manifest, not only in the form of closed door meetings, but predominately also in a growing set of rules regarding the creation and management of official secrets, the EUCI. These rules establish extremely rigid limitations of access to sensitive information and have become a real challenge to conducting oversight in the EU, be it of a judicial, administrative or parliamentary nature. 13 This section outlines the main aspects of the EUCI legal framework and focuses on the extent to which MEPs have access to official secrets. Moreover, the section examines the institutional efforts of the European Parliament to address the challenges that arise due to limited or belated access to official secrets.
Parliamentary access to EU official secrets
Challenges to parliamentary oversight in the EU arise due to the fact that the EUCI significantly limits access to relevant sensitive information. The EUCI legal framework is fragmented and of an administrative nature. Different rules on access to official secrets apply in the Member States that in turn affect access to official secrets at the EU level. Yet, the framework of rules on official secrets is also varied at the EU level and a variety of actors are involved, such as executive institutions like the Council and the Commission, but also bodies like the European External Action Service or agencies such as Europol. 14 The only directly relevant legislative act for the system of classified information is Regulation 1049/01-the Transparency Regulation, regarding the right to public access of information in the EU. 15 Therein, Article 9 defines the category of classified information as 'sensitive documents (…) which protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States in the areas (…) [of] public security, defence and military matters' . Regulation 1049/01 does not specify the general principles regarding the management of EUCI, nor is it its legal rationale to do so. 16 It merely points to a different handling process for public access requests of EUCI due to their sensitive nature.
The internal administrative nature of the EUCI system already reflects the fact that the European Parliament did not have a direct say in the manner in which classification rules were to be established. Moreover, to a great extent, the executive actors ignored the calls of the European Parliament for openness, considering that the EUCI was treated as an internal administrative policy and there was no legal obligation to consult the European Parliament or request its consent. 17 The EUCI rules are engineered by executive actors following a security rationale that, in practice, leads to tensions with the European Parliament's oversight prerogatives, specifically with regard to access to official secrets. 18 The current EUCI system operates on a rigid principle regarding the sharing of information, known as 'originator control' , which gives the original institution that created the official secret the discretion to decide whether its disclosure may be authorised. 19 In other words, originator control means that the actor who provides the classified information retains complete control over its dissemination by other actors with whom such information has initially been shared. This rule aims at safeguarding the originators' discretion. This key principle of the classification system leads to an inevitable clash between, on the one hand, confidentiality and trust amongst executive actors that maintain the secrets and, on the other hand, the accessibility of information for oversight institutions, such as the 
Institutional responses to challenges of secrecy
The European Parliament has made significant efforts to address the limitations of access to information imposed by EU official secrets rules. One of the first steps of the European Parliament to be able to access classified information was to establish an internal system on EUCI. -which provided a basis for the implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement with the Council-had set out the basic principles and the necessary measures for being able to exchange information in the area of security and foreign policy. It is noteworthy that the manner in which the Bureau established the rules of classification is similar to the executive institutions. This implies that the Bureau did not carry out any public deliberation about the rules. Furthermore, the fact that only the Bureau has worked on the rules since their establishment shows that this was also considered an administrative and internal institutional matter. 36 The institutional negotiations for the European Parliament to be granted access have been long and arduous. 37 The implication from the fragmented nature of the classification system is that the European Parliament negotiated separately with each institution regarding access to EUCI and with some actors, like Europol, it is only now, through its newly gained oversight prerogatives, that access would be legally possible. 
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Agreement to reflect both the reforms carried out since it was concluded and the current situation of increased prerogatives. that the European Parliament uses the veto on the external issues of EU law to also strengthen its position internally, 45 and it does so by refusing or delaying consent.
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For example, the European Parliament refused consent to the EU-US Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) Agreement and delayed consent to the USA and Australia Passenger Name Records Agreements.
Regarding the SWIFT Agreement, the European Parliament gave its consent at a later stage but, as some scholars note, there were 'no remarkable differences between the first and second SWIFT agreements' . 47 Rather, the difference was that, on the second round, the European Parliament was fully informed at all stages of the negotiations.
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The European Parliament also has new legislative powers in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and has used such powers to enhance its access to classified information. For example, in line with Article 88 TFEU, the European Parliament has become a co-legislator in issues relating to law enforcement cooperation, and on this basis, the European Parliament is in the process of setting up a regime for access to classified information held by Europol. Moreover, even when the European Parliament does not have legislative powers, and is not directly involved in setting up EU bodies, it has used its prerogatives over the EU budget in order to assert its oversight position. 49 For example, in the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the initial proposals did not contain an explicit right for the European Parliament to have access to the EEAS's classified information. However, the European Parliament on its first position regarding the establishment of the EEAS, was explicit in its ambition to gain access to classified information by calling for a modification of the draft text. Without adopting a separate legal arrangement with the EEAS for access to its classified information, Lastly, access to relevant information may also be facilitated through cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments. For example, empirical research shows that, when inter-parliamentary meetings take place between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, they mostly discuss and refer to issues related to oversight within questions of security and foreign policy. 51 In light of the discussion thus far regarding access to classified information and the European Parliament's efforts to overcome the limits imposed by executive actors, it becomes apparent that the European Parliament has indeed moved forward institutionally to assert its oversight role. Although in practice, limitations of access to classified information in a timely manner is not a foregone issue, in the current legal context, to a significant extent, the European Parliament manages to receive the relevant information for oversight due to its internal rules for EUCI as well as its broader oversight powers, such as consent to international treaties and budgetary powers. Hence, the main aspect in the interplay of parliamentary oversight and executive secrecy is no longer only access to classified information, but also the question of how such access takes place and what are the significant consequences for the democratic role of the European Parliament to have access to classified information. 
Closed parliamentary oversight vs public debate
The manner in which parliamentary oversight takes place in the EU, insofar as the EUCI is concerned, has been a somewhat neglected element in the discussion regarding the role of the European Parliament and executive secrecy. This section aims to fill that gap by examining how parliamentary oversight takes place. In particular, under what conditions, and using what methods, do the MEPs-and possibly their staff-access classified information? What precisely can they do once they access those documents?
Reviewing documents à huis clos
When requests for access to classified information are approved by executive actors in line with the prerogatives of the European Parliament for oversight, documents are reviewed at the premises of the Council. a key working principle of categorising and limiting access to official secrets. The 'need-to-know' the content of the classified document is determined on the basis of the specific responsibilities of the individual while conducting his or her work. 54 Hence, there is a discrepancy between individuals authorised to file requests for access to classified information and those individuals who receive the classified documents. Furthermore, only those individuals who the President of the European Parliament considers to have a relevant need to read the classified document in relation to their work conduct the review of the classified documents. 55 As a result, it is more appropriate to conclude that access and review of classified documents protected through the EUCI system are concentrated with certain MEPs and relevant Committees as opposed to discussing access and review at a level of the European Parliament as an institution. This leads some MEPs to be very sceptical regarding the prospect of successful oversight, even after having gained access to official secrets:
It is very difficult to really scrutinise [considering the conditions in which oversight involving classified information is organised]. You also cannot really talk to each other, to your MEP colleagues. You are not free to work with the classified documents. And the thing is that I and also many colleagues have our staff reading and writing some of the issues, hence when it is about classified information it becomes difficult or impossible to actually do that.
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The MEPs that are granted access to EUCI undergo a strict legal and security procedure in order to review the documents. 57 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 6(5) of the Interinstitutional Agreement, the meetings between the Council and the European Parliament are held behind closed doors when EUCI documents are discussed. Documents are distributed at the beginning of the meeting and collected again at the end; documents may not be copied by any means, such as photocopying or photographing; no notes may be taken; and the minutes of the meeting cannot make any mention of the discussion of the item containing classified information. 58 Furthermore, for access to documents classified at a higher level than 'EU Confidential' , the Council makes arrangements on an ad hoc basis.
The experience with the Agreement shows that those documents are accessed at the Council's premises and under strict security, where all the above-mentioned conditions apply. 59 These arrangements result in parliamentary oversight taking place behind closed doors, or more simply stated, they result in closed oversight. Closed oversight means that both the manner in which oversight is conducted and the results of oversight are not public to the other members of parliament and to the general public. Closed oversight from the strict perspective of reviewing executive decisionmaking is not necessarily problematic. Should there be issues of wrongdoing or abuse of power by executive actors, the MEPs would be able to report such conduct and initiate the necessary inquiries as well as legal action in accordance with Article 263(2) TFEU. Nevertheless, closed oversight is problematic from the perspective of the democratic process of public deliberation. The role of MEPs is not merely to ensure that executive actors are not breaching their powers, but it is fundamental that they provide the link between what takes place at the executive decision-making level and the European citizens.
Implications of closed oversight: Missing public debate
Keeping oversight means two main things: First, having the powers and second, mobilising the public. I think that the European Parliament has focused and still does the first thing; it is always trying to secure its powers-it is used to doing thatit knows how to do that. Debate is completely underdeveloped.
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This was the frank summary of a former Member of the European Parliament regarding the balance and difficulties in ensuring both processes of oversight and public deliberation. The European Parliament seems to be asserting its powers of oversight through its institutional fights to gain access to classified information, even when this type of access to classified information is done in a 
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very rigid manner that limits (public) usability of the information learned. The main implication of closed oversight is that the European Parliament is unable to foster public deliberation. The oversight role of the European Parliament is not strictly relevant for accountability, which is defined in principle as one actor giving account to another actor followed by the consequences. Oversight is relevant for democratic processes that aim to ensure the formation of public opinion and the formation of public deliberation necessary towards that end. This understanding of the role of the European Parliament is based on a conceptualisation of oversight to facilitate processes of accountability and deliberation as equally relevant for the European project. It is important to highlight in this respect that EU primary law stipulates various sets of processes that are conducive to public deliberation and specific processes that aim to ensure accountability. The EU has a constitutional commitment to democracy and the principle of openness.
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Processes of deliberation aim to grant citizens a participatory role in decisionmaking. Deliberation requires that citizens have relevant information to be able to engage in shaping policies and are hence informed about processes of oversight and the exercise of secrecy. From this perspective, it is required that core choices regarding secrecy are made in an open manner and through public debate. Hence, more clarity should be established between what is considered secret and what is open information that may be publically discussed. 62 In this regard, it has been rightly noted that in a representative democracy 'worthy of its name one of the truly distinctive qualities of parliaments is their publicness, the fact that they constitute a public forum as opposed to an accountability relationship among peers' . 63 It is necessary from this perspective of public deliberation that the MEPs discuss and communicate how the interests and rights of citizens are affected and what is relevant for them to know. The requirements for the exercise of secrecy, which are directed at ensuring deliberation, are that citizens must know that discussions or some decisions are being kept secret. 64 The necessity of public information for deliberation creates a higher threshold on the question to what extent secrecy should be limited because, in order to realise processes of deliberation, some information should always be directly available to the citizens. Although that information does not need to be specific and detailed, it is very relevant that citizens, in broad terms, know what the policy is about, what interests are at stake and what means are suggested to protect those interests. For example, citizens or the European Parliament would know that Europol is conducting an investigation about cybercrime in the EU, but they would not need to know which individuals are being investigated or more specific information about their location, which could possibly jeopardise the outcome of the investigation. Such an approach to availability of information aims to ensure that security concerns are met and public deliberation can take place.
An additional important element is that the outcomes of the oversight process should be public. From this perspective, the question of oversight is not only about 'policing' the actors if there is a wrongdoing, but it is a question of debates that are also oriented towards future prospects of how things should be done and enabling citizens to formulate and express their agreement. Such oversight outcomes may be a public statement, a report or a debate. However, on the basis of the European Parliament's resolutions and statements regarding EUCI and its emphasis on gaining access, rather than fostering transparency and deliberation, it is noticeable that the institutional focus and efforts were centred on the mere point of gaining access to classified information. The European Parliament's main concern was not to be outside the 'secrecy circle' and left uninformed about important EU developments in the area of security and foreign relations. Less attention or concern was paid to the consequences of access to classified information and the manner in which it was organised for the European Parliament's other functions, such as deliberation, or the manner in which access would be organised. Institutional instruments which would allow the European Parliament to be able to make public a clear demarcation of what remains closed are not foreseen in the current EUCI framework, including the European Parliament's own rules about classified information.
Due to closed oversight and the obligations of the European Parliament not to disclose EUCI in any manner, the specific outcomes of the oversight process are not made public. Classified information and its access by MEPs are not allowed to be included even in the meeting minutes. 65 The consequences of closed oversight when considered with the fact that European Parliament has no institutional measures to alert the public (besides individual MEPs alerting the press, for example) raises concerns since, as recent research has shown, 'democratic 65 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council of 12 March 2014 (n 6) arts 6(5) and 6(6).
controversy, transparency and critical debate' are mostly avoided. 66 Parliamentary questions are the only form of public oversight. 67 They are also published on the European Parliament's website, as well as in the EU's official journal. The caveat here is that the content of classified information will not be discussed. Hence, when oversight processes are open, crucial questions regarding classified information may be left unanswered by invoking executive secrecy. Closed oversight is not unique to the European Parliament. Indeed, comparative examples from Member States show that they, too, despite long traditions of civil liberties, have adapted to, and adopted, oversight processes that seriously challenge public deliberation and fundamental rights in the face of security and the secrecy rules that are said to be necessary for such security policies. 68 Moreover, the oversight of intelligence agencies has traditionally been more secluded from public view. What is different in the EU, however, is that oversight processes were negotiated behind closed doors by the executive and oversight institutions and established through interinstitutional agreements and internal rules of procedure. It is not possible to determine at the present stage what interests the European Parliament particularly defended or how the negotiations with the Council regarding access to classified information developed in more detail, since the majority of documents is also undisclosed or significantly redacted, even after more than a decade since these arrangements were made.
Towards oversight and public deliberation
The role and relevance of the European Parliament for advancing openness in the European Union and ensuring oversight of executive actors are its significant features as the only direct representative of the European citizens. The oversight role of the European Parliament has attracted significant interest, 69 Another key aspect of the European Parliament is that it has a unique role in fostering public deliberation in the EU. Hence, Parliamentary oversight is not merely about giving account, but also has a significant role to ensure space for citizens' participation. The key question, then, becomes to what extent the European Parliament is fostering processes of oversight, but also ensuring its deliberation function and bringing secrecy practices more into citizens' view. The necessity of openness for deliberation creates a higher threshold on the question of the extent to which secrecy should be limited because it requires that some information is available to the citizens. The European Parliament is yet to make serious efforts to develop its public deliberation function, and in doing so, to also bring attention to possible extensive secrecy practices. Significantly, closed oversight as it is conducted now could have the effect of making the European Parliament seem as part of an overall system of keeping EU official secrets that legitimises secrecy, but that creates a (further) separation and distance from the citizens whose rights and interests the European Parliament is constitutionally obliged to protect. 
